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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SURVEY
INTRODUCTION
Federal administrative agencies play a large role in articulating and
implementing public policy in the United States.' Thus, they wield a
power that affects the lives of all Americans. Congress and the courts con-
tinue to develop legal principles that attempt to define the limits of that
power. In doing so, however, they consistently take a deferential approach
to agency action. This broad deference to agency action raises questions
as to whether any meaningful limits on agency action exist.
In its most recent term, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit continued its policy of extending substantial deference to
agency decision-making. The court did so by reaffirming its adherence to
three widely accepted principles of administrative law: (1) deference to
reasonable agency interpretation of its governing statute; (2) limiting re-
view of agency action to "review on the record"; and (3) deference to
agency action that is not "arbitrary or capricious." These highly deferen-
tial standards do not, however, provide a substantial check on agency
power.
In NLRB v. Viola Industries-Elevator Division, Inc.,2 the Tenth Circuit
extended deference to the National Labor Relations Board's decision to
reinterpret a portion of its governing statute.3 The new interpretation dis-
placed a long-standing rule that the Supreme Court had arguably articu-
lated as the law. 4 The agency's adoption of a new, albeit, reasonable
interpretation of the statute raised serious questions under the separation
of powers doctrine.
5
In Bar MK Ranches v. Yuetter,6 the Tenth Circuit limited its review of a
United States Forest Service decision to the "record." The court narrowly
interpreted this "review on the record" limitation to include only those
documents examined by the agency when it made its original determina-
tion. 7 In some cases, this narrow interpretation of the "record" will pre-
clude the court from undertaking a more substantive evaluation of the
legality of the agency's action.
Within the narrow boundaries of "review on the record," the court in
Yuetter only sought to determine if the agency decision was arbitrary or
capricious. 8 This is arguably the most deferential standard of review. This
1. William L. Andreen, An Introduction to Federal Administrative Law Part I: The Exercise of
Administrative Power and Judicial Review, 50 ALA. LAw. 322 (1989).
2. 979 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1992).
3. Id. at 1394.
4. Id. at 1398.
5. Id. at 1397.
6. 994 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1993).
7. Id. at 739.
8. Id.
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standard was also strictly applied in Lewis v. Babbitt,9 where the Tenth Cir-
cuit reviewed various decisions by the National Park Service to determine
if they were arbitrary or capricious.
10
These cases illustrate the Tenth Circuit's adherence to broadly ac-
cepted principles of administrative law that extend substantial deference
to agency action. This broadly deferential approach, however, raises ques-
tions as to whether there are meaningful limits on agency power.
I. WHEN AN AGENCY CHANGES ITS MIND: DEFERENCE, RETROACTIVrrY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN ALRB v. VIOLA
INDUSTRIES-ELEVA TOR DnwsIov, INC.1
A. Background
1. Deference to Agency Interpretations
The Administrative Procedure Act 12 ("APA") provides a uniform set
of legal principles to be applied to federal agencies.13 The APA, and the
Supreme Court's interpretation of its various provisions, establish the basis
for judicial review of administrative decisions.
14
From this foundation, Congress and the federal courts have contin-
ued to struggle with exactly how to control the authority of administrative
agencies. Judicial review of agency action is generally considered a neces-
sary check against abuses of agency authority. 15 Yet, judicial intervention
can frustrate an agency's effectiveness.
16
The APA does not explicitly indicate how much deference should be
accorded to agency interpretations. 17 Thus, the question of when courts
should defer to an agency's interpretation of its governing statute has
been the basis of considerable debate. The judiciary's approach has
ranged between two extremes: courts ignoring the administrative view and
employing traditional tools of statutory interpretation to arrive at what
they regard as the best interpretation of the statute; and courts framing
the inquiry in terms of whether the administrative interpretation is one
that a reasonable interpreter might make.18 Under the latter deferential
approach, a court acknowledges that the statute is susceptible to multiple
interpretations.' 9 The court does not attempt to discover the best inter-
9. 998 F.2d 880 (10th Cir. 1993).
10. Id. at 881.
11. 979 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1992).
12. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
13. Id.
14. John C. Haas, Survey, Administrative Law, 70 DENV. U. L. REv. 625, 625 (1993); see also
Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 307-08 (1986)
(stating that courts are mandated by the APA to "check" administrative agencies).
15. Eric M. Braun, Note, Coring the Seedless Grape: A Reinterpretation of Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. NRDC, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 986, 987 (1987).
16. Id.
17. See5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).





pretation, but rather seeks to assure that the agency view does not contra-
dict the statute.
20
Prior to the 1984 Supreme Court decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,21 courts were inconsistent in their
approach toward the issue of deference.2 2 Chevron provided a procedural
formula for courts to follow in determining whether to defer to agency
interpretations. The issue in Chevron was the meaning of the term "statio-
nary source" in the 1970 and 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act.23
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) interpreted the term to
mean that an entire factory could be a single "stationary source" under
certain circumstances. 24 This became known as the "bubble concept"
since an entire factory would be treated as a single stationary source en-
closed in a bubble.
25
The court of appeals held that the EPA's interpretation conflicted
with the statute. 26 The court recognized that neither the statutory lan-
guage nor the legislative history compelled any particular interpretation of
the term "stationary source."2 7 The court reasoned, however, that the cor-
rect meaning of the term could nevertheless be drawn from the overall
statutory purpose.2 8 This approach allowed the court to conclude that the
bubble concept was statutorily prohibited because the general purpose of
the Clean Air Act Amendments was to improve, rather than merely main-
tain, air quality.
2 9
The Supreme Court reversed,3 0 declaring that the appellate court
"misconceived the nature of its role in reviewing the regulations."3 1 The
Court then set out a two-step test for judicial review of agency statutory
interpretations:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spo-
ken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is
20. Id.
21. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
22. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 18, at 971; Claude T. Coffman, Judicial Review of Adminis-
trative Interpretations of Statutes, 6 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 1, 3 (1983); see also Haas, supra note 14,
at 625 (discussing the Supreme Court's inability to develop a consistent position on defer-
ence prior to 1984).
23. 467 U.S. at 840; see Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 111 (a) (3),
84 Stat. 1676, 1683 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a) (3) (1988)); Clean Air
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 172(b) (6), 91 Stat. 685, 747 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b) (6) (1988)). The term was important because to construct or modify a
"stationary source" that emitted more than 100 tons of pollution per year and was located in
an area that did not meet federal air quality standards, an applicant had to comply with
rigorous statutory standards. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864 n.38.
24. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840; see also 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766 (1981) (notice of a final rule
adopting the "plantwide" definition). The EPA's definition would limit the number of
sources to be reviewed for permits. See id.
25. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
26. NRDC v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
27. Id. at 726 n.39.
28. Id. at 726.
29. Id. at 726-27.
30. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
31. Id. at 845.
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clear,.., the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however....
the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific is-
sue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute.
3 2
The Court equated "permissible" with "reasonable."33 In order for an
agency construction to be upheld as reasonable, "[t] he court need not con-
clude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could
have adopted.., or even the reading the court would have reached if the
question initially had arisen in ajudicial proceeding."3 4 Under Chevron, if
the meaning of a statute is unclear, the agencies are the preferred gap
fillers.3 5 This is an deferential standard that may, in some cases, conflict
with the separation of powers doctrine.
2. Deference and the Separation of Powers
The United States Constitution grants legislative powers to Con-
gress,3 6 executive power to the president,3 7 and judicial power to the
Supreme Court and its inferior courts.38 Despite this scheme, there is
overlap in the functions of each branch of government.3 9 This overlap is
especially evident in the power delegated to administrative agencies,
which typically serve quasi-legislative, quasi-executive, and quasi-judicial
functions.40
The power of administrative agencies to make determinations of law
is an especially troubling area of overlap. The Chevron doctrine, which
holds that courts must defer to reasonable interpretations of law made by
administrative agencies, has been attacked on the grounds that it violates
the separation of powers principle of the Constitution.4 1 Moreover, the
Chevron doctrine arguably usurps judicial authority and grants excessive
power to administrative agencies.
42
3. Retroactive Application of Administrative Rules
Courts generally favor prospective application of rules when an
agency responds to actions of parties who have relied in good faith on
32. Id. at 842-43.
33. See id. at 844.
34. Id. at 843 n.ll.
35. Id. at 843-44. See generally Robert J. Gregory, When a Delegation is Not a Delegation:
Using Legislative Meaning To Define Statutoy Gaps, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 725 (1990) (discussing
congressional delegation of rulemaking authority to administrative agencies).
36. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 1.
37. Id. art. II, § 1, ci. 1.
38. Id. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
39. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Dea 101 HARv. L. Rav. 421, 430
(1987) (arguing that the notion of separation of powers is in some respects a mischaracteriza-
tion of our constitutional system).
40. See Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of Powers in the
Post-Chevron Era, 32 B. C. L. Rav. 757, 758-59 (1991).




prior agency pronouncements. 43  However, retroactive application of
rules may be necessary in some cases in order for the agency to carry out
Congress' delegation efficiently.
4 4
There are two different types of retroactive rulemaking. 45 First, an
agency may make a curative rule by retroactively remedying a procedural
defect in an existing rule without substantively changing the content of
the rule.46 Second, an agency may substantively modify an existing rule
regardless of the presence of a prior defect.4 7 This latter type of retroac-
tive rule is more problematic. Its validity generally depends upon a bal-
ancing of congressional intent and the needs of the administrative agency
against potential hardship to persons who have relied on the prior rule.
48
A court may extend deference to any reasonable agency interpreta-
tion.49 This is true even when the agency radically changes its mind.
50
When an agency does so, however, and attempts to apply the new interpre-
tation retroactively, the court should try to avoid hardship to persons who
relied on the prior agency rule.5 1
B. Agency Action
In NLRB v. Viola Industries-Elevator Division, Inc.,52 the National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board") found that Viola Industries-Elevator
Division, Inc., and Viola Industries, Inc. (collectively, Viola Industries), vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act 53 (the "Act") by not honoring a
prehire agreement 54 it entered into with the International Union of Eleva-
tor Constructors (the "Union").
55
Under the original provisions of the Act, employers were not permit-
ted to bargain with a union that had not been selected by the majority of
the employees. 5 6 Originally, the union could establish majority status only
through voluntary recognition by the employees or formal certification.
5 7
Congress, however, determined that applying these rules to the construc-
tion industry posed some unique problems due to the usual short duration
43. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290-95 (1974).
44. For instance, agencies occasionally must adjust public programs retroactively in or-
der to allocate limited funds fairly.
45. Richard J. Wolf, Note, Judicial Review of Retroactive Rulemaking: Has Georgetown Ne-
glected the Plastic Remedies?, 68 WASH. U. L. Q. 157, 163 (1990).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 164.
48. Id.
49. NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamen-
tal Iron Workers (Higdon), 434 U.S. 335, 350 (1978).
50. Id. at 351.
51. See Consolidated Freightways v. NLRB, 892 F.2d 1052, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied 498 U.S. 817 (1990).
52. 979 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1992).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 158(0 (1988).
54. "A prehire agreement is an arrangement unique to the construction industry in
which an employer enters into an agreement with a union before the union has been desig-
nated or selected as the representative of the workforce." Viola, 979 F.2d at 1389.
55. Id. at 1389.
56. Id. at 1392.
57. Id.
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of construction jobs.58 Consequently, Congress amended the Act to pro-
vide that it was not an unfair labor practice for a construction employer to
enter into a collective bargaining agreement with a union prior to the
union attaining majority status.59
Thus, the newly adopted Section 8(f) permitted prehire agreements
in the construction industry. In R.J. Smith Construction Co.,60 the NLRB
determined Section 8(f)'s relation to other provisions of the Act. The
doctrine developed in R.J. Smith Construction Co. endured for seventeen
years and has been interpreted to stand for the following rule:
[A] § 8(f) prehire agreement was merely a preliminary step which
contemplated further action [toward] the development of a full
bargaining relationship. During this preliminary stage there was
no presumption of majority status which would protect the signa-
tory union from challenge during the contract's term. The
agreement ... could be repudiated by either party at any mo-
ment ....
However, a prehire agreement could convert into a full Sec-
tion 9(a) [majority status] relationship ... upon a showing that
the signatory union enjoyed majority support, during a relevant
period, among an appropriate unit of the signatory employer's
employees.
6 1
From 1972 to 1982, Viola Industries, an installer and servicer of eleva-
tor equipment, entered into a series of prehire contracts with the Union.
6 2
After entering into the third prehire agreement, which was signed Decem-
ber 14, 1982, and was effective for five years, Viola Industries began several
elevator-installation projects. 63 Viola Industries, however, repudiated this
third prehire agreement on November 4, 1983.64
The Union immediately filed a claim with the NLRB alleging that Vi-
ola Industries violated the Act by repudiating the agreement.6 5 An Ad-
ministrative Law Judge ("ALJ") determined that the Union had attained
majority support from Viola Industries' employees at some point between
1978 and 1980.66 Pursuant to the rule from R.J. Smith Construction Co., the
union was retroactively converted into the full-fledged bargaining repre-
sentative of Viola Industries' employees. 67 Because Viola Industries could
not repudiate this agreement, the ALJ ordered Viola to pay back wages




60. 191 N.L.R.B. 693 (1971), vacated and remanded, Local No. 150, International Union
of Operating Engineers v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
61. Vio/a, 979 F.2d at 1392 (citations omitted).
62. Id. at 1389.
63. Id. at 1389-90.







After the decision of the ALJ, the NLRB overruled its prior interpreta-
tion of Section 8(f) in John Deklewa & Sons.69 This new interpretation was
affirmed on appeal by the Third Circuit in International Ass'n of Bridge,
Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 3 v. NLRB (Iron Workers).70 The
court of appeals enforced the Board's new rule that Section 8(f) agree-
ments were no longer unilaterally voidable, thereby making these agree-
ments enforceable until expiration. 71 The Board also abandoned the
"conversion doctrine," holding that Section 8(f) prehire agreements were
only enforceable during the term of the agreement and could not convert
into traditional collective bargaining agreements without a standard elec-
tion and certification.
72
The Board announced that it would apply the new Section 8 (f) princi-
ples "to all pending cases in whatever stage." 73 Thus, it applied the princi-
ples from Deklewa to Viola and found that the prehire agreement was
binding and could not be repudiated by either party.
74
C. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
1. Majority
Viola Industries argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that Deklewa
was not a proper interpretation of the Act.75 It further contended that
those who had relied on the old rule should not be subject to retroactive
application of the new rule, even if that rule was proper.
76
Citing two prior Supreme Court opinions, NLRB v. Local Union No.
103, International Ass 'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers (Hig-
don)77 and Jim McNeff Inc. v. Todd,78 Viola Industries argued that without
majority status, the collective bargaining relationship and a union's au-
thorization to represent the employees are not triggered. 79 Thus, it ar-
gued the Board exceeded its statutory authority by granting majority status
under Section 9(a) based solely upon the signing of a prehire
agreement.
80
69. 282 N.L.R.B. 1375 (1987), enforced sub nom. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural
& Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 3 v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
889 (1988).
70. 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 889 (1988).
71. Id. at 775.
72. Id.
73. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1389.
74. Viola, 979 F.2d at 1390.
75. Id. at 1391.
76. Id. For cases supporting Viola Industries argument see Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd,
461 U.S. 260 (1983); Trustees of Wyo. Laborers Health and Welfare Plan v. Morgan & Os-
wood Constr. Co., Inc., 850 F.2d 613 (10th Cir. 1988); Trustees of Colo. Statewide Iron Work-
ers (Erector) Joint Apprenticeship and Training Trust Fund v. A & P Steel, Inc., 812 F.2d
1518 (10th Cir. 1987); New Mexico Dist. Council of Carpenters v. Jordan & Nobles Constr.
Co., 802 F.2d 1253 (10th Cir. 1986).
77. 434 U.S. 335 (1978).
78. 461 U.S. 260 (1983).
79. See Viola, 979 F.2d at 1393 (citing Higdon, 434 U.S. at 346).
80. Id.
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The Tenth Circuit examined Higdon first. In that case, the Supreme
Court affirmed the Board's reliance on its earlier R.J. Smith Construction Co.
decision that established the pre-Deklewa interpretation of Section 8(f).81
The Tenth Circuit noted, however, that the Higdon court upheld the
Board's decision because " '[t]he Board's resolution of the conflicting
claims... represent[ed] a defensible construction of the statute and [was]
entitled to considerable deference.' "82 Therefore, the Higdon court was
not stating the law with regard to Section 8(0, but merely was extending
deference to the Board for a permissible statutory interpretation.
83
In examining McNeff, the Tenth Circuit stated that McNeff simply re-
lied on Higdon and did not reexamine the court's review function in these
types of cases.8 4 Thus, McNeff should not be viewed as a new approach
distinct from the rule of deference in reviewing Board interpretations of
the Act.85 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit concluded that McNeff did not
prevent the court's use of the Dekiewa rule.
8 6
The court then held that the R.J. Smith Construction Co. rule was not
the only reasonable interpretation of the statute, but that the Board's
Deklewa rule was also a reasonable interpretation.8 7 "[I]n administrative
adjudicatory proceedings courts 'will uphold a Board rule [so] long as it is
rational and consistent with the Act.' "88 A mere departure from prece-
dent does not invalidate the Board's Deklewa decision. 89 Moreover, " '[a]n
administrative agency is not disqualified from changing its mind.' "90
81. See Higdon, 434 U.S. at 350-52.
82. la, 979 F.2d at 1393 (quoting Higdon, 434 U.S. at 350).
83. Id.
84. Vw/a, 979 F.2d at 1393 (citing McNeff, 461 U.S. at 265-71). The court went on to
state that since McNeff, the Supreme Court has continued to stress the Higdon principle of
deference. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) as an
example).
85. Vw/a, 979 F.2d at 1394.
86. Id. The Tenth Circuit also held that its earlier decisions, see cases cited supra note
76, did not preclude it from adopting Dddewa. Viola, 979 F.2d at 1394. Although each case
upheld the Rj Smith Construction Co. repudiation principle, the court reasoned that because
those cases also relied on McNeff, which does not bar application of the new Deklewa doctrine,
neither do those cases. Id.
The court found the Third Circuit's opinion in Iron Workers, upholding Dekiewa, to be
persuasive. Id. at 1395. The Third Circuit stated that prior Supreme Court decisions involv-
ing the Board's RJ. Smith Construction Co. interpretation simply reviewed the Board's prior
interpretation and did not adopt the R.J. Smith Construction Co. interpretation of the statute
as binding. Id.
The court noted that four other circuits have followed the Third Circuit on this issue.
Id. at 1394 n.3 (citing C.E.K. Indus. Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 921 F.2d 350, 357
(1st Cir. 1990); NLRB v. Bufco Corp., 899 F.2d 608, 609 (7th Cir. 1990); NLRB v. W.L. Miller
Co., 871 F.2d 745, 748 (8th Cir. 1989); Mesa Verde Construction Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist.
Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d 1124, 1126, 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 1988)).
87. Id. at 1395.
88. Id. at 1394 (quoting NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 787
(1990)).
89. Id. at 1395.
90. Id. (quoting Higdon, 434 U.S. at 351).
[Vol. 71:4
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Finally, the court addressed the question of whether the new interpre-
tation could be applied retroactively. 91 The court followed the Third Cir-
cuit9 2 and held that the Board's new rule regarding Section 8(f) could be
applied retroactively unless manifest injustice would result. The court
held that any frustrated expectations resulting from the Board's applica-
tion of the new Deklewa rule would not, in general, amount to manifest
injustice.9 3 Eliminating the right to repudiate prehire contracts only
binds the parties to terms which they themselves negotiated.
94
2. Dissent
In his dissent, Judge Baldock neither took issue with whether the new
Deklewa rule was a permissible interpretation of the statute, 9 5 nor with the
argument that the Delkewa rule achieved the goals of the NLRB more ef-
fectively than the rule from R.J. Smith Construction Co.9 6 Judge Baldock's
dissent focused instead on his concern for the separation of power be-
tween the courts and the executive branch. 97 He felt that the majority
"revise[d], ultra vires, the Supreme Court's opinion in [McNefJ] in order to
avoid this substantial constitutional question."9 8 The McNeff court inter-
preted the statute to settle a private lawsuit.9 9 Unlike Higdon, the McNeff
court was not reviewing an agency decision and nowhere limited its inter-
pretation of Section 8(f) to "being merely a defensible construction." 10 0
Judge Baldock stated that "the judicial deference afforded to an
agency's construction of a statute has no place outside of... reviewing an
agency decision." 10 1 To resolve the issue before it, the court in McNeff
construed Section 8(f) and clearly stated that the RJ. Smith Construction Co.
rule was the law.1 0 2 Therefore, until an act of Congress or a Court deci-
sion overrules this precedent, it binds the lower courts as well as the ad-
ministrative agency.
10 3
91. Id. at 1396. "Several Circuits have addressed the question of whether a new rule
announced by an . . . agency in adjudicatory proceedings is to be applied retroactively and
have upheld retroactive application unless manifest injustice would result." Id. (citing NLRB
v. Bufco, 899 F.2d 608, 611 (7th Cir. 1990); Consolidated Freightways v. NLRB, 892 F.2d
1052, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1989); NLRB v. Semco Printing Cent., Inc., 721 F.2d 886, 892 (2d Cir.
1983); NLRB v. New Columbus Nursing Home, Inc., 720 F.2d 726, 729 (1st Cir. 1983)).
92. See supra note 86.
93. Viola, 979 F.2d at 1396.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1397.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1397-98.
99. Id. at 1398.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1399. "A [Section] 8(f) prehire agreement is subject to repudiation until the
union establishes majority status." Id. (citing McNeff, 461 U.S. at 271). In addition, Judge
Baldock noted that "subsequent cases interpreting McNeff never portended that the meaning
given to [Section] 8(f) was merely a defensible construction; rather the [Tenth Circuit] ap-
plied the McNeff interpretation of [Section] 8(f) as if it were the law." Id. at 1399; see supra
note 76.
103. Viola, 979 F.2d at 1399.
1994]
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D. Analysis
Proponents of the deferential approach in Chevron argue, among
other things, that agencies are more competent to interpret the statutes
they administer. 10 4 When administering their governing statutes, agencies
must do more than simply determine congressional intent; administrative
statutory interpretation also involves complicated policy judgements. 0 5
Agencies are more efficient fact-finders, have greater technical expertise,
and should be afforded great deference.
10 6
Chevron, however, arguably went too far. The broad deferential ap-
proach in Chevron raises the question as to whether it will bring about an
erosion ofjudicial review conferred by the constitution and by the APA.
0 7
This is especially true when a court defers to an agency interpretation that
is contrary to a prior judicial interpretation. To defer under these circum-
stances raises serious issues concerning the separation of powers. The
rules of deference should not be applied as an absolute rule, particularly
when deferring might violate fundamental constitutional principles.
The court in Viola deferred to an agency interpretation that was a
reasonable construction of the statute.1 0 8 However, the interpretation
constituted a change from a prior interpretation that had been articulated
in the courts as law. Deference under these circumstances should have
triggered analysis under the separation of powers doctrine. The court
avoided this substantial constitutional question by asserting that the court
in McNeff was operating under some deferential standard of review.10 9
This is arguably an incorrect reading of McNeff. As the dissent indicates,
the court in McNeff recited an interpretation of Section 8(f) in order to
settle a dispute between private parties and was not reviewing an agency
decision.11 0 Therefore, to defer to the NLRB's new interpretation, which
was contrary to the holding in McNeff would allow an agency to overrule
judicial precedent.
While deference is appropriate in some cases, Viola exemplifies the
need for clear limits on its application. The principles of deference
should never be used as a pretext for avoiding substantial constitutional
questions.
In addition, the court in Viola applied the new rule retroactively. Cit-
ing Third Circuit rationale, the court held that to apply the new rule retro-
actively would not result in "manifest injustice."' It reasoned that
application of this rule, which eliminated the right to repudiate prehire
104. See Braun, supra note 15, at 989.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Timothy B. Dyk, The Supreme Court's Role in Not Shaping Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN.
L. REV. 429, 431 (1992); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2075 (1990) (stating that Chevron is widely regarded as a "counter-
Marbury" for administrative law).
108. Viola, 979 F.2d at 1395.
109. See id. at 1394.
110. Id. at 1398.
111. Id. at 1396.
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contracts, would only hold the parties to terms that they themselves nego-
tiated.1 12 Therefore, in the court's mind no manifest injustice occurred.
The court diminished the potential hardship to Viola Industries by
suggesting that Viola Industries would have entered into the agreement
regardless of the Board's new construction of Section 8(f) in Deklewa.
11 3
This is speculative at best. The prior rule from R.J. Smith Construction Co.
had endured for seventeen years. It would have been reasonable for Viola
Industries to have relied on this rule in making its contract decisions with
the Union. The new rule from Deklewa removed the element of flexibility
that the old rule provided employers that contract with unions. Applica-
tion of the new rule in Viola saddled Viola Industries with financial obliga-
tions1 14 it might have been able to avoid under the old rule. Therefore,
retroactive application of the Deklewa rule created a hardship on Viola In-
dustries and, arguably, constituted manifest injustice.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY DECISIONS AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD: BAR MKRNCHFS v. YUE7Fr
a 1 5
A. Background
Administrative agencies impact our society tremendously, and thus ju-
dicial review must provide meaningful checks to agency action. The APA
authorizes judicial review of agency actions. 1 6 Courts, however, review
whether the agency's action was arbitrary or capricious and not whether
the agency should have decided the matter differently. 117 This is a very
deferential standard.
While judicial review provides some protection against the unbridled
power of an administrative agency, the Supreme Court has limited the role
of courts in reviewing agency decisions.1 18 Courts may not substitute their
judgments for those of the agency. 119 In reviewing informal agency ac-
tions,' 20 the APA limits courts to "review on the record." 121 This generally
112. Id. The majority also stated that the ALJ's determination that the Union did have
majority status and, consequently, that the 8(f) agreement became enforceable undermined
Viola Industries' claim of manifest injustice. Id. at 1397. However, it is unclear to what de-
gree the court relied on this rationale in upholding retroactive application in Viola
113. See id. at 1396.
114. Viola Industries' agreement with the Union obligated them to pay wages and bene-
fits. See id. at 1390.
115. 994 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1993).
116. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988).
117. See id. § 706.
118. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Camp v.
Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
119. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
120. Under the APA, agency action can take the form of formal rulemaking or adjudica-
tion, with specified proceedings including trial hearings, witnesses and administrative law
judges. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-557 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). This formal action results in a defined
record similar to that in a court.
Agency rulemakings or adjudications can also be informal. There are sometimes general
requirements for "informal" agency decisions, including proposed rules in the Federal Register,
acceptance of comments from outside parties, and publication of a statement of purpose
with final rules. Id. §§ 553(b)-(c). While formal types of administrative action define the
record more clearly, informal agency actions often do not; the APA provides little guidance
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means that courts should never examine an agency decision de novo; but
rather, courts should limit the review to those documents examined by the
agency when it made its original determination.
122
For administrative agency decisions, the APA provides "thorough re-
view" based on the "whole record" of a case. 123 The APA, however, does
not explicitly define what that "record" should include. The statute and its
legislative history provide little guidance as to the meaning and scope of
this term. 124 In informal adjudication, the APA only requires a "brief
statement of the grounds" for an agency's action.1 25 This requirement,
however, is so ambiguous as to provide little practical guidance in deter-
mining the scope of the "record" on review.
The Supreme Court has struggled with this ambiguous language and
has chosen to define the scope of the record very narrowly. In Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,12 6 the Supreme Court instructed the
lower court to look only at what the agency relied upon in the record as
the basis for its rationale. 127 In Camp v. Pitts,12 8 the Court applied the rule
of Overton Park and held that an agency's failure to explain adequately its
final decision does not warrant a completely new hearing consisting of
additional oral testimony before the court.129 Rather, the reviewing court
should require the agency to explain its action by submitting only neces-
sary additional evidence in the form of affidavits or written testimony.
130
Overton Park and Camp provide the general scope of the doctrine of
"review on the record." Despite the Supreme Court's narrow approach,
the doctrine has developed over time to include various far-reaching ex-
ceptions that permit the admission of additional evidence that the agency
claimed was not part of the record. 13 1 It has been argued that these broad
beyond requiring a "brief statement of the grounds" for the agency action. Id. § 555(e).
Courts have responded to this ambiguous language by requiring the agency whose conduct is
being challenged to assemble the record for the court.
121. Id. § 706 (requiring the court to "review the whole record").
122. See, e.g., Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420; Camp, 411 U.S. at 142. The record is more
difficult to determine when the court reviews informal rather than formal agency actions. See
supra note 120.
123. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
124. See William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38,
40-41 (1975); see also supra note 120 (comparing the unclear APA provisions for informal
agency actions with the statute's more defined provisions for formal agency actions).
125. 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (Supp. IV 1992).
126. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
127. Id. at 420.
128. 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
129. Id. at 142-43.
130. Id. at 143.
131. See Steven Stark & Sarah Wald, Setting No Records: The Failed Attempts to Limit the Record
in Review of Administrative Action, 36 ADMIN. L.J. 333, 343-54 (1984). Stark and Wald note:
[T]he exceptions which have developed to allow extra-record evidence are the fol-
lowing: (1) when agency action is not adequately explained in the record before
the court; (2) when the agency failed to consider factors which are relevant to its
final decision; (3) when an agency considered evidence which it failed to include in
the record; (4) when a case is so complex that a court needs more evidence to
enable it to understand the issues clearly; (5) in cases where evidence arising after
the agency action shows whether the decision was correct or not; (6) in cases where
agencies are sued for a failure to take action; (7) in cases arising under the National
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exceptions essentially erode the Overton Park-Camp rule.1 3 2 The Tenth Cir-
cuit, however, reaffirmed the viability of that rule in its most recent term.
B. Agency Action
In Bar MK Ranches v. Yuetter,1 33 a group of landowners who held na-
tional forest grazing permits challenged the decision of the Forest Service
to move 150 elk to the Manti-LaSal National Forest near Monticello,
Utah. 134 Following regulatory procedure,1 35 the landowners appealed the
decision to the Regional Forester.13 6 After the Regional Forester affirmed
the original decision, the landowners appealed to the next administrative
level. 137 The Chief of the Forest Service also affirmed, and the decision
became final after the Secretary of Agriculture refused discretionary
review. 
138
The landowners then filed for judicial review of the Forest Service's
decision in federal district court. 139 The Forest Service accordingly filed
its Administrative Record 140 along with a motion for summary judg-
ment.1 41 The landowners responded, arguing that the Forest Service did
not comply with its regulations concerning the development of the agency
appeal record' 42 and that the Administrative Record was not adequately
developed. 143
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Forest
Service, concluding that the Forest Service had complied with its own reg-
ulations and that the Administrative Record was adequate to evaluate the
agency's decision. 144 The agency appeal record and the Administrative
Record issues were then presented on appeal to the Tenth Circuit.
145
C. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
The landowners first contended that the Forest Service improperly
interpreted the regulatory provision, which states that "an appeal decision
Environmental Policy Act; and (8) in cases where relief is at issue, especially at the
preliminary injunction stage.
Id. at 344.
132. See id. at 358. But see, Dave Sive, The Problem of the "Record" in Judicial Review of Environ-
mental Administrative Action, C637 ALI-ABA 29, 39 (1991) (stating that in his opinion the
doctrine is still viable).
133. 994 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1993).
134. Id. at 737.
135. See36 C.F.R. § 211.18(0 (1987).
136. Yuetter, 994 F.2d at 737.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 738.
139. Id.
140. The administrative record constitutes the record filed in the district court by the
Forest Service for judicial review of the Forest Service's decision. Id.
141. Id.
142. The agency appeal record constitutes the record developed through the internal
agency review process. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 737.
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will be based only on the record."146 They argued that the Forest Service
violated the regulation by basing its decision on information not con-
tained in the agency appeal record. 147 Thus, the agency appeal record
was improperly developed.148 The Tenth Circuit disagreed, holding that
the Forest Service's interpretation and application of its regulation were
"reasonable and consistent with the regulation's plain meaning."1 49
The landowners also alleged that the Administrative Record filed with
the district court included some documents not considered by the agency
and failed to include other documents that were considered by the
agency, thereby preventing the court from adequately reviewing the Forest
Service's actions. 150 The Tenth Circuit addressed this issue by returning
to the principles set forth in Overton Park and Camp.15 1 The court stated
that a district court reviews an agency action to determine if it was "arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with the law."1 52 This review is based on the record that was before all
administrative decision makers, including the Deciding Officer and the
Reviewing Officers. 153 Theref3re, the Administrative Record submitted to
the district court was sufficient if it contained all documents considered at
all stages of the Forest Service's decision process.
154
The court held that the landowners failed to establish that the Admin-
istrative Record in this case was developed improperly. 155 While the land-
owners could verify that certain documents included in the Administrative
Record and filed with the district court were not part of the agency appeal
record, they failed to show that these documents were not part of the doc-
uments considered by the Deciding Officer.
15 6
146. 36 C.F.R. § 211.18(r) (1987); Yuetter, 994 F.2d at 738.
147. Yuetter, 994 F.2d at 738.
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 739.
151. See id.
152. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A)).
153. Id. (citing Overton Pa, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971)). The Tenth Circuit further stated
the law as follows:
The district court must have before it the "whole record" on which the agency ac-
ted. "[TIhe focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record al-
ready in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court." The
complete administrative record consists of all documents and materials directly or
indirectly considered by the agency.
An agency may not unilaterally determine what constitutes the Administrative
Record, nor can the agency supplement the Administrative Record submitted to the
district court with post hoc rationalizations for its decision. However, the designa-
tion of the Administrative Record, like any established administrative procedure, is
entitled to a presumption of administrative regularity. The court assumes the
agency properly designated the Administrative Record absent clear evidence to the
contrary. When a showing is made that the record may not be complete, limited
discovery is appropriate to resolve that question. The harmless error rule applies to
judicial review of administrative proceedings, and errors in such administrative pro-
ceedings will not require reversal unless Plaintiffs can show they were prejudiced.
Id. at 739-40 (citations omitted) (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973)).
154. Id. at 739.




Finally, the landowners alleged that certain documents submitted to
the district court by the Forest Service were "post hoc rationalizations" for
its decision. 15 7 The court held, though, that the landowners made no
showing of prejudice from the alleged post hoc rationalizations.15 8
D. Analysis
Bar MK Ranches v. Yuetter clearly indicates that the Overton Park-Camp
approach to judicial review on the record is still viable in the Tenth Cir-
cuit. The Yuetter court declared that the administrative record submitted
to the district court is complete if it contains "nothing more and nothing
less" than the full record considered and developed at all stages of an
agency's decision process. 159 This language echoes the narrow standard
of record review articulated in Overton Park and Camp.
The doctrine of review on the record stems from the concern that
courts should not replace administrative agencies' decisions with their
own. 160 Courts might begin acting more as independent decision makers
if they are able to consider materials that were not before the agency when
it made its decision.
161
A broader notion of the record for informal agency decisions, how-
ever, does not necessarily suggest unacceptable court involvement.
1 62
With informal agency action, many of the procedural protections of the
APA are unavailable. 16 3 Therefore, courts should "undertake a more
searching review of the record and the merits in order to assure that
agency action is lawful."1 6 4 Without a broader notion of record review,
agencies have almost unreviewable authority, which frustrates the objec-
tives of judicial review. 165 Thus, like the Chevron doctrine, "review on the
record" provides little opportunity for the court to limit agency action.




The APA provides standards to be applied by courts reviewing agency
action. 167 These standards are intended to ensure that "the courts do not
improperly usurp the prerogatives of the legislature" to administer the ac-
tivities of agencies or hinder the agency's ability to exercise authority
157. Id. at 740.
158. Id. "Although allegations of a post hoc addition to the Administrative Record suffi-
ciently alleges procedural error, an allegation of a post hoc addition does not in itself suffi-
ciently allege prejudice." Id.
159. Id. at 739.
160. See Stark & Wald, supra note 131, at 334.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 361.
163. Id. at 362.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. 998 F.2d 880 (10th Cir. 1993).
167. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
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properly entrusted to it. 168 The APA applies the "substantial evidence"
standard of review to formal rulemaking and formal adjudication. 169 In
situations where an agency acts through informal rulemaking or informal
adjudication, the APA requires a reviewing court to decide whether the
agency's action was "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.
170
The substantial evidence and arbitrary and capricious standards of review
are both reasonableness standards simply requiring that the administrative
record reflect sufficient facts to support the agency's decision.
17 1
The "arbitrary and capricious" standard permits a court to set aside an
agency decision only if it is "so clearly outside the range of action expected
from responsible decision makers that [it] cannot successfully be defended
as an exercise of reasoned judgment."172 This standard of review is argua-
bly the most deferential form of review. The Supreme Court in Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,173 held that a court must determine
whether the agency decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been
a clear error ofjudgment .... Although this inquiry into the
facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of re-
view is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute
its judgment for that of the agency.
17 4




In Lewis v. Babbitt,176 Lewis contested the National Park Service's
("NPS") interpretation of the National Park System Concessions Policy
Act 177 and the NPS's decision not to negotiate a new permit with him.
178
Lewis sold firewood as the concessioner in Yellowstone National Park from
1976 to 1989.179 In 1989, the NPS received two proposals for the conces-
sion permit for the next four-year period, including Lewis's, and ulti-
mately decided to award the permit to Firebox Inc. ("Firebox") after
determining that Lewis could not demonstrate the ability to finance his
amended proposal. °8 0 After review, the district court granted the NPS's
motion for summary judgment.18 1
168. ARTHUR E. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING § 9.2.12(f) (1986).
169. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
170. Id. § 706(2) (A).
171. Melissa A. Dick, Survey, Administrative Law, 69 DENV. U. L. REv. 791, 791-92 (1992).
172. BONFIELD, supra note 168, § 9.2.12(b).
173. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
174. Id. at 416.
175. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973); see supra part III.A.
176. 998 F.2d 880 (10th Cir. 1993).
177. 16 U.S.C. §§ 20-20g (1988).






C. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit established at the outset that it was reviewing the
agency decision to "determine whether it was 'arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.' ",182 Apply-
ing this standard, the court held that the NPS did not act unreasonably in
determining that Firebox's proposal was responsive to the Statement of
Requirements ("SOR") for the permit or by requiring Lewis to match Fire-
box's proposal. 183 The Tenth Circuit held that the NPS's findings sur-
vived the arbitrary and capricious standard of review.
184
The court also held that the NPS did not arbitrarily and capriciously
determine that Lewis's amended proposal failed to satisfy the SOR's finan-
cial requirements. 185 Lewis was notified that Firebox had submitted a pro-
posal to sell firewood from vending machines twenty-four hours a day.
1 86
Lewis then submitted an amended proposal which indicated that he also
intended to sell firewood through vending machines and that he would
match the terms of Firebox's proposal.18 7 The amended proposal, how-
ever, did not provide information on how Lewis intended to finance the
machines.
88
On February 20, 1990, Lewis identified two possible sources of financ-
ing.189 The next day, the NPS contacted both potential lenders and dis-
covered that Lewis had not yet contacted either lender about his
proposal.1 90 On March 5, 1990, Lewis sent a letter to the NPS stating that
he was also prepared to lease the vending machines in the event his loans
were denied. 19 1 The NPS, however, did not receive the letter until the day
after it had determined that Lewis was without adequate financing to im-
plement his proposal.' 9 2 Given these circumstances, the Tenth Circuit de-
termined that the NPS's decision was not arbitrary or capricious.'
9 3
Finally, the court held that the NPS did not act arbitrarily by allowing
Firebox, but not Lewis, to supplement its proposal with additional finan-
cial information. 194 The court found this argument unconvincing be-
cause the SOR stated, "[t]he National Park Service may verify information
182. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988)).
183. Babbitt, 998 F.2d at 882. The SOR provided:
To be responsive, proposals must be accompanied by a signed letter and must con-
tain sufficient information to convince the Secretary acting through the Superintendent
that the proponent meets the principal and secondary factors in the following para-
graph. All responsive proposals will be further reviewed and evaluated to determine









191. Id. at 882-83.
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and clarify points as it feels necessary. It will not evaluate supplemental
information or alterations of the proposal made that are submitted after
the closing of the time period for receipt of proposals."1 95 Based on its
review of evidence in the administrative record, the court concluded that
the NPS did not act "arbitrarily or capriciously" in rendering its decisions
and thus affirmed the district court's decision to grant the NPS's motion
for summary judgment. 19 6
D. Analysis
Agencies are accorded substantial deference when they act through
informal rulemaking or informal adjudication. It is thought that these ac-
tions typically require the agency to retain a high degree of discretion in
order to exercise its congressionally delegated authority. LXWis v. Babbitt is
a clear illustration of the Tenth Circuit's approval of this deferential
approach.
Agencies should have some discretion in administering agency affairs
because they are more knowledgeable in their delegated area of authority
than the courts. This point is well illustrated in Babbitt. It is also true,
however, that the power delegated to administrative agencies since the
New Deal has increased dramatically. 19 7 Thus, agency decisions have a
tremendous impact on contemporary life. In view of this trend, courts
should reevaluate their role as reviewing bodies to ensure that agency
power does not go unchecked.
Because the arbitrary and capricious standard of review is so deferen-
tial, agencies enjoy a great deal of latitude in informal decision making.
This standard does not permit the court to disagree with an agency deci-
sion that is arguably wrong unless the decision rises to this heightened
level of error. Thus the court is restricted in its ability to protect those
aggrieved by an agency decision.
CONCLUSION
During the Tenth Circuit's most recent term, the court reviewed sev-
eral agencies' decisions. The broad principle of deference to agency ac-
tion remained a cornerstone of the Tenth Circuit's review. This
deferential approach was reflected in the court's deference to an agency's
reinterpretation of its governing statute, its upholding retroactive applica-
tion of agency decisions, its adherence to the "review on the record" doc-
trine, and its application of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of
review.
Application of these deferential standards, however, while broadly ac-
cepted, does raise questions under the separation of powers doctrine in
certain instances. In addition, given the broad impact that administrative
agencies have on society, the deferential approach towards review of
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See Andreen, supra note 1.
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agency action should be reconsidered in light of the need for meaningful
limits on agency power.
Phillip F. Smith Jr.

